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The gendered employment gains of investing in social vs. 
physical infrastructure: evidence from simulations across 
seven OECD countries 
Jerome De Henau and Susan Himmelweit 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Public spending on social infrastructure is usually seen as a cost rather than an investment, 
and not considered for investment-led Keynesian stimulus policies, despite having long-term 
economic and social benefits. This paper simulates and compares the (gendered) total 
employment effects of investing in the care and construction industries, as examples of social 
and physical infrastructure respectively, across seven OECD countries. Our simulations show 
that investment in care generates more total employment, including indirect and induced 
employment, than investment in construction, especially for women, and almost as much 
employment for men. This structural difference remains, though is somewhat reduced, if the 
analysis is conducted in FTEs with wages in care matched to those in construction. Further, 
the fiscal returns from investing in care are higher, allowing greater investment for the same 
net cost. Equalising net spending therefore gives investing in care a further advantage in 
employment creation over investing in construction. 
 
Keywords: gender equality, investment, social infrastructure, care, employment 
JEL: C67, H54, J16 
 
Introduction  
 
Public investment is needed in social as well as physical infrastructure (Elson and Pearson, 
2015; Himmelweit, 2016; Ilkkaraçan, 2013, 2017; Onaran, 2017). “Social infrastructure” 
refers to the human and social capital produced by the education, health and care services that 
reproduce the economy and its workforce. For a Keynesian-inspired stimulus, only “physical 
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infrastructure” investment, such as constructing housing, roads and bridges, tends to be 
considered. However, both types of infrastructure provide public good benefits. As such, both 
require public intervention, because with social benefits greater than their private benefits, 
both will be underprovided if provision is left to market forces alone. 
 
The 2007-08 financial crisis led to some public investment to stimulate economies, before 
subsequent fiscal retrenchment heavily restricted public spending (Ganelli and Trevala, 2016; 
Truger, 2016). Care services, neglected even before the crisis, were cut in many countries 
despite fast rising demand, leading to a ‘care deficit’, with damaging consequences for well-
being. While investment in the construction sector was seen as productive and worthy of 
taxpayers’ money, investment in care was presented as a cost whose funding should be 
contained (Elson, 2016). There was little or no gender impact analysis of such spending 
priorities, and little notice taken of empirical studies demonstrating the advantages of 
investing in care over investing in construction, in terms of both short-term employment 
creation and gender equality effects (Antonopoulos and Kim, 2011; Ilkkaraçan et al., 2015; 
De Henau et al., 2016). 
 
Building on earlier work (De Henau et al., 2016), this paper compares the (gendered) total 
employment effects of investing in the caring and construction industries, as examples of 
social and physical infrastructure respectively, across seven OECD countries. The 
simulations show that, including indirect and induced employment effects, more employment 
in total, and especially for women, would be generated by investment in the caring industries. 
Further, the number of jobs generated for men would be almost as large as for investing in 
construction.  
 
Perhaps these results could be explained by lower average wages and working hours in care 
than in construction found in nearly all countries. If these fully explained the additional 
employment generated, then investing in care would be a questionable gender equality policy 
that could work only by generating more poor-quality jobs for women. So, we additionally 
calculate our results in terms of full-time equivalent employment and reinvestigate 
employment generation after equalising wages in the two sectors. Although removing 
differences in hours and wages reduces the difference in employment generated, the 
conclusion remains robust that care generates superior employment results.  
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Some of the costs to the government of investing in either sector will be recouped through 
increased tax revenue from newly employed workers; more will be recouped the greater the 
employment created, reducing the net cost of the investment. We therefore also compare the 
level of employment creation by investment in the two industries for the same net cost. 
 
The next section examines the gender biases inherent in the neglect of social infrastructure in 
public investment priorities and why that matters in the context of fiscal consolidation. We 
then go on to explore existing empirical evidence of the potential (gendered) employment 
gains from investing in social infrastructure, before describing our own comparative 
empirical approach and considering the factors that might explain our results. The following 
section outlines the simulation method and data we have used, before giving results that 
include some additional simulations to investigate how far differences in working hours or 
wage levels explain our results. The penultimate section examines fiscal effects, before the 
conclusion considers implications for investment policy as well as further research that might 
strengthen such a policy case. 
 
The neglect of social infrastructure in gender-biased investment 
policies  
 
Conventionally, a national infrastructure programme entails spending on physical 
construction projects such as roads, railways, telecommunications, hospitals, schools and 
green technologies (Skidelsky and Fraccaroli, 2017; IMF, 2014). While any expenditure will 
boost an economy operating below full capacity, the argument for delivering that boost by 
public investment in infrastructure is that it both has long-term benefits and, because those 
benefits have a public good character, is unlikely to be funded by private investors.  
 
Both points also apply to what we call “social infrastructure”, the human and social capital 
that is produced and maintained by caring services, health and education. Spending on these 
industries can be an investment when, like physical construction, it contributes to building a 
stock of capital, in this case human and social instead of physical capital, whose use leads to 
benefits for the future. Further, human and social capital also resembles physical 
infrastructure in that it benefits not only those who use it directly, but society as a whole. 
And, like physical infrastructure, human and social capital tend to be underprovided if left 
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purely to private investment. We therefore have public health, education and, increasingly, 
child and elder care systems, and it is reasonable to see much spending on them as investment 
in our “social infrastructure”.1 
 
In the 1990s, public spending on education and health began to be recognized as a form of 
social investment in workers’ productivity and thus the productive capacity of the economy. 
Governments began to describe their role as enabling a ‘social investment state’ that by 
fostering employability skills and opportunities would increase productivity (Morel and 
Palier, 2011). Public spending on childcare was supported on similar grounds: but here the 
productivity gains were not only from children in the future, but also from mothers retained 
in the labour force continuing to use their skills (Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2003; Bonoli & 
Natali, 2012; European Commission, 2013). 
 
This argument is rarely made about public spending on elder care, even though having fewer 
employment interruptions for carers and worries about their relatives’ care is likely to make 
those workers more productive, as is not having concerns about their own future well-being. 
However, the argument that expenditure on preventative health and social care is an 
investment in future well-being that reduces the need for future public expenditure has gained 
ground over the past decade (Brouselle et al. 2016; Gaughan et al., 2015; Lopes, 2017).  
 
Nevertheless, despite the expected impact on the economy and public finances, and the 
rhetoric of ‘social investment’, internationally agreed fiscal accounting methods treat 
physical and social infrastructure quite differently, with far-reaching funding implications. 
Spending on social infrastructure remains classified as ‘current’ rather than ‘capital’ 
expenditure in the national accounts (United Nations, 2009; Elson, 2017). The international 
System of National Accounts (SNA) considers spending on physical infrastructure alone as 
‘gross capital formation’, its term for investment. The SNA counts only what is transferable 
to others as having value and contributing to GDP; it therefore does not value, or even 
recognise, human and social capital. As a result, the SNA classifies expenditure on the 
construction of schools, hospitals, care homes and nurseries, including on the wages of the 
 
1 This definition of “social infrastructure” differs from that used by many, such as the European Commission, 
who use it to refer to the physical infrastructure required for social services, thus school and hospital buildings 
(Fransen et al., 2018). In our definition, social infrastructure is the human and social capital that such services 
themselves build. 
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building workers, as capital expenditure. However, expenditure on what is done in these 
facilities, which largely goes on the wages of teachers, doctors, nurses and care workers, is 
classified as current expenditure.  
 
The SNA distinction between capital and current spending matters because governments’ 
rules and practices tend to be more tolerant of deficits incurred through making capital rather 
than current expenditure (Truger, 2016). This attitude is, at least in part, based on the premise 
that the former creates assets that generate revenue (often from increased economic activity) 
which can help pay off any resultant debt. Thus, the rigid criteria of the European Union’s 
Stability and Growth Pact, for example, can be relaxed for investment purposes (IMF, 2014; 
OECD, 2017). Logically such “investment” should include spending on social infrastructure 
too, since such spending also generate assets: a well-functioning society and a healthy, well-
educated population, both increasing productivity and generating future revenue (or, in the 
case of preventative investment, reducing the need for future spending).  
 
Yet, despite the rhetoric of social investment, the economic and fiscal returns of spending on 
social infrastructure are hardly recognized. A blog arguing for investing in transport 
infrastructure, illustrates the point (Tweedale, 2018): 
 
“. . . we need a government that is focused on generating long term wealth through a strong 
economy, one that doesn’t automatically divert funds to short term fixes to meet the raised 
voices calling for more money for the NHS [the National Health Service]. . . . my concern is 
that if we don’t think and act to build long term wealth, we won’t have the economy to 
generate the money to pay for the NHS . . .” 
 
That health spending is seen as a ‘quick shot-term fix’ that has to be paid for by ‘the 
economy’, rather than building ‘long term wealth’, denies the role of social infrastructure in 
making the people more effective in generating such wealth. 
 
Failure to recognise social infrastructure spending as investment, is consistent with a more 
general pro-market bias in what constitutes an economic gain, with contributions to GDP 
alone being counted, excluding those to any more inclusive concept of well-being. There is a 
related pro-market bias in how investment projects are appraised, with time that is priced 
through the wage being counted, while unpaid labour time is not. Economic assessments of 
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the value for money of social infrastructure spending, using standard accounting 
methodology, tend therefore to ignore the opportunity cost of unpaid care (Streeck and 
Mertens, 2011), reducing how effective such spending appears. As a consequence, social 
infrastructure services are seen as a drain on the public finances, leading to sub-optimal 
provision, and continual pressures to reduce costs, thereby reinforcing the need for unpaid 
domestic substitutes (Seguino, 2010).  
 
Both those pro-market biases are also gender biases, in that women, by their greater 
contribution than men to unpaid care, are more likely both to make contributions to well-
being not valued by the market and to have their labour time uncosted by it (Balakrishnan et 
al., 2016). There is also a gender bias in those who benefit from investment in physical versus 
social infrastructure. Continuing gender divisions in the roles of men and women, particularly 
with respect to care, lead women to make more use of healthcare, care and education services 
for themselves or for those for whom they care, while men, freed of such caring 
responsibilities, make more use of physical infrastructure, such as roads and railways (Gill, 
2018). Further, where both private and public services exist alongside each other, publicly 
provided services are more likely to be used by women, because of their lower incomes on 
average, often consequent upon current or past caring roles.  
 
Finally, competing spending priorities that favour physical infrastructure also create a gender 
bias in the employment opportunities generated, since in most countries physical 
infrastructure projects tend to employ mainly men, while social infrastructure services 
employ more women. It is this particular gender bias that the remainder of this paper 
investigates. 
 
Employment effects of social infrastructure investment   
 
Measuring the longer-term social and economic benefits of investing in social and physical 
infrastructure is difficult and subject to both methodological and conceptual challenges.  
However, the case for such investments is strengthened by any short-term employment 
opportunities they create, and further strengthened if they thereby reduce gender inequalities. 
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While such supply-side benefits of investing in care have been investigated at length 
(Ilkkaraçan, 2017),  only a few studies have analysed the demand side employment creation 
effects of spending on care (see Ilkkaraçan, 2017, for a review; ILO, 2018; De Henau, 2019), 
and not many of these compare those effects with those of spending on other sectors. The 
German Ministry for Economic Affairs examined the impact on a range of economic 
indicators of staged annual investment in a range of sectors (including ‘physical 
infrastructure’ and ‘all day school/childcare’). On all indicators investment in all day 
school/childcare outperformed investment in physical infrastructure, by generating more 
employment and greater fiscal returns (Krebs and Scheffel, 2016).  
 
A method of investigation developed by the Levy Economics Institute, close to that of this 
paper, but simulating just direct and indirect employment effects, was used to compare the 
(gendered) employment generated by investment in care and in construction, as examples of 
industries that produce social and physical infrastructure respectively, for South Africa and 
the United States (Antonopoulos and Kim, 2011) and Turkey (Ilkkaraçan et al., 2015). In all 
three countries, investment in care generated far more employment, the majority of which 
went to women, whereas investment in construction resulted in fewer jobs, with more going 
to men.  
 
This paper expands on these studies by (i) including induced employment effects and doing 
so cross-nationally, (ii) examining how far any difference in employment effects is due to 
differences in industries’ working hours or wages and (iii) taking account of the fiscal 
revenue generated by employment creation to compare the employment effects of 
investments of similar net annual cost. 
 
Empirical approach 
 
Our comparative analysis examines seven OECD countries, namely, Australia, Denmark, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the USA, chosen to cover a variety of welfare systems, 
and differences in the level, quality and type of care provisioning.   
 
Table 1 shows that public spending on care services varies greatly between the seven 
countries, reflecting different priorities of their welfare regimes. 
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Table 1 Public spending on care services (% GDP – circa 2011) 
 
Childcare 
services 
Long‐term care 
services 
Australia  0.38  0.80 
Denmark  1.51  2.35 
Germany  0.49  1.02 
Italy  0.62  1.04 
Japan  0.13  1.87 
United Kingdom  0.44  1.42 
United States  0.37  0.57 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD (2019) and De Henau et al. (2016) 
 
Table 2 shows that the countries also vary in the relative importance of care and construction 
to employment, and in the working hours, gender composition and pay in the two industries, 
with workers in the care industry the more likely to be part-time, women and paid lower 
wages (the latter except in Japan). Self-employment is more prevalent in construction than in 
care, especially in the UK. 
 
In order to make meaningful cross-country comparisons, we estimate the employment impact 
of investing 1% of GDP in the care and construction industries in each of our countries. We 
give the impact on employment broken down into direct, indirect and induced effects, as well 
as the gender breakdown of each of these effects.  
 
“Direct employment effects” capture the employment created in the industry in which the 
investment takes place. Investment in any industry will generate additional employment as 
demand is increased for the products of its suppliers. Such demand will ripple down the 
supply chain, generating “indirect employment effects”. Besides these indirect effects there 
are also “induced employment effects” as a result of the additional household income 
generated by the additional employment. Some of this additional household income will be 
spent and become a further source of increased demand within the economy, generating jobs 
in the sectors in which households spend their income.  
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Table 2 Employment structure in care and construction 
 
 
Total 
employment 
(000s) 
% of total 
employment 
% of FTEs / 
Headcount 
(HC) jobs 
% women 
(HC) 
Wage cost per 
FTE (relative to 
average wage 
cost) 
% employees 
(HC) 
  All  Cons  Care  Cons  Care  Cons  Care  Cons  Care  Cons  Care 
Australia  12,463  8%  4%  93%  76%  11%  79%  117%  114%  75%  96% 
Denmark  2,756  6%  12%  79%  63%  10%  82%  90%  85%  89%  100% 
Germany  38,702  7%  5%  94%  80%  13%  75%  79%  70%  81%  91% 
Italy  22,513  8%  2%  97%  90%  6%  85%  76%  69%  62%  85% 
Japan  66,569  9%  4%  91%  81%  14%  77%  72%  81%  71%  99% 
UK  28,873  8%  6%  96%  81%  11%  80%  99%  44%  61%  92% 
USA  182,278  5%  4%  ‐  ‐  13%  81%  115%  50%  65%  84% 
Source: De Henau et al. (2016). HC stands for headcount (persons) and FTE for full-time equivalents. FTE data 
not available for the USA. Wage cost is measured by the total compensation of employees (= gross earnings + 
employers’ social security contributions) per FTE employee in the industry as % of the national average.  
 
 
There are a number of factors that might explain why total employment creation from 
investing the same amount in the two industries might be differ:  
(i) Structural: the industries and their suppliers might differ in their labour intensity 
and/or the extent to which they use imported inputs directly and indirectly; 
(ii) Working hours: the industries and their suppliers may differ in their typical hours of 
employment, so that the same number of working hours results in different number of 
jobs being created; 
(iii) Wages: the two industries and their suppliers may pay different wages.  
Which factor lies behind any differences in employment effects matters. If greater 
employment effects are found simply because wages are worse or hours shorter in one 
industry, then it begs the question of whether investment in it is simply expanding poor 
employment conditions. It is therefore important to consider whether the greater employment 
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effects of investing in a particular industry would remain even if conditions in that industry 
were improved.  
 
Our first estimations are of the differences in the headcount employment effects of investing 
in the two industries, in which the contributions of factors (i) – (iii) are not distinguished. 
Subsequent estimations show how far any differences would be reduced if working hours and 
wage costs were equalised between the two industries (so that factors (ii) and (iii) did not 
apply). This leaves structural differences in labour and import intensity as the explanation of 
any remaining differences in employment effects. If these remain substantial, then improving 
working conditions in a lower-paying, but greater employment-generating industry, 
potentially a necessary condition for recruiting enough workers, reduce but do not undermine 
the case for investing in it. 
 
Methods and data 
 
This paper uses standard input-output multiplier methods to investigate the effect of 
increasing the demand and thus output of a single industry. Such methods assume that the 
physical input and employment requirements per unit of each industry’s output remains 
unchanged, as do all prices and wages. Input-output tables show how much (in price terms) 
each industry’s production process uses the output of every industry (including its own) as 
inputs. 
 
The direct employment effect of increases in the output of an industry is calculated from that 
industry’s labour input per unit of its output. I-O tables can then be used to calculate total 
input requirements down the supply chain and thus the Type I employment multiplier (directly 
and indirectly generated employment per additional worker directly employed).2  
 
We use a similar process to calculate the Type II employment multiplier that also includes the 
“induced” employment effect of the increased earnings of the newly employed. To do this, 
households are effectively treated as another industry, whose inputs are given by the spending 
of households on the outputs of each other industry. Augmented I-O tables can then be used 
to calculate total employment generated including “induced” employment. Doing so assumes 
 
2 See Scottish government (2015) for more details on how multipliers are calculated using input‐output tables. 
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additionally that the proportions in which households spend their total resources (both earned 
and unearned income) are unchanged (Scottish government, 2015). 
  
Our calculation of induced effects does not include the effect of increased spending by the 
newly self-employed owing to lack of data on their income. Induced effects are therefore 
somewhat underestimated, and more so for investment in construction than in care, given the 
larger prevalence of self-employment in the former (Table 2).  
 
That various ratios in production remain unchanged, in particular, that increasing demand for 
an industry does not change its production methods and the wages that it pays, is a strong but 
usual assumption in such analysis. However, the additional assumption required for 
calculating induced employment effects, that a policy that increases demand in one industry 
does not change the pattern of household spending, needs justification. For construction, it is 
not unreasonable; public construction projects are typically different from those on which 
households spend their income.3 However, in the absence of public provision, some 
households spend money buying care that they may not need to once provision is publicly 
funded. So, to justify assuming unchanged household spending patterns, we should see the 
investment being modelled as providing publicly funded care services, but with a financial 
contribution required from households equal to the household sector’s current spending on 
care. 
 
We estimate gendered employment effects by assuming that current gender employment 
ratios by industry do not change as a result of such investments, again a strong assumption, 
but plausible given similar results obtained with more refined job-matching methods by 
Antonopoulos and Kim (2011) and Ilkkaraçan et al. (2015). 
 
Data for input-output tables are derived from the national accounts and employment data 
from official labour force surveys, both provided by national statistical offices and Eurostat. 
The reference year is 2010 for Italy, Germany and the UK, 2011 for Denmark and Japan and 
2013 for the USA and Australia. 
 
 
3 Spending might change as a result of the construction, but typically not while the investment in construction 
is being made, which is what matters here. 
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Results  
 
Table 3 shows the direct, indirect and induced employment effects of a 1% of GDP 
investment in the care and construction industries. For comparative purposes, we report the 
number of jobs generated relative to the working-age population, i.e. by the rise in the 
employment rate. 
 
Table 3 Rise in employment rate (% points) from investment of 1% of GDP in 
construction and care industries 
 
   Construction     Care   
Ratio of effects 
Care/Construction 
   Direct  Indirect  Induced  Total     Direct  Indirect  Induced  Total     Direct  Indirect  Induced  Total 
Australia  0.2  0.4  0.2  0.9    1.2  0.1  0.4  1.7  4.7  0.3  1.9  2.0 
Denmark  0.4  0.3  0.1  0.8    1.3  0.1  0.2  1.6  3.1  0.5  1.7  2.0 
Germany  0.5  0.3  0.2  0.9    1.4  0.2  0.3  1.9  2.8  0.7  1.6  2.0 
Italy  0.3  0.4  0.1  0.8    0.8  0.3  0.2  1.2  2.4  0.7  1.6  1.5 
Japan  0.7  0.4  0.3  1.4    1.0  0.2  0.4  1.7  1.5  0.6  1.2  1.2 
UK  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.9    1.0  0.7  0.2  1.9  2.5  2.2  1.4  2.2 
USA  0.6  0.3  0.6  1.5     1.7  0.3  0.8  2.7    2.7  0.9  1.3  1.8 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
Table 4 shows gendered employment effects by the percentage of jobs created that would be 
filled by women. 
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Table 4 Percentage of new jobs filled by women by investment in construction and care 
industries 
  Construction  Care 
  Direct  Indirect  Induced  Total  Direct  Indirect  Induced  Total 
Australia  11%  32%  50%  32%  79%  43%  50%  68% 
Denmark  10%  32%  44%  26%  82%  41%  44%  69% 
Germany  13%  33%  51%  28%  75%  50%  51%  67% 
Italy  6%  24%  44%  21%  85%  53%  44%  70% 
Japan  14%  33%  46%  29%  77%  41%  46%  62% 
UK  11%  23%  46%  24%  80%  67%  46%  69% 
USA  13%  37%  52%  35%  81%  43%  52%  67% 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
 
Direct effects 
 
Table 3 shows that the direct employment effect of investing in care is considerably larger 
than that of investing in construction in all countries. The ratio of employment created in the 
two industries varies from less than twice as many in care as in construction in Japan to 
nearly five times as many in Australia. Both these industries are highly gender-segregated – 
construction even more so than care – so that of the jobs directly generated, only 6-14% 
would go to women in construction, but 75-85% of the jobs in care. In Italy the direct impact 
of investment in care appears lower than in other countries, where it is unlikely that the data 
used fully captures the well-known “grey economy” of migrants in Italy’s social care system, 
leaving formal care provision geared towards less labour-intensive residential nursing care 
(Mingione, 2009; OECD, 2011). 
 
Indirect effects 
 
Table 3 shows that in all countries except the UK, indirect job creation is greater if the 
investment is made in construction than in care.  This is consistent with construction using 
more inputs provided by other industries than the more labour-intensive care industry. 
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However, the greater indirect employment effects of investing in construction do not 
outweigh the greater direct effects of investing in care, so the total Type I effect, the sum of 
direct and indirect employment effects remains larger for investment in care. 
 
Again, the size of the indirect effect varies across countries, with the UK an outlier for care, 
and Australia for construction. More detailed calculations show that two thirds (65%) of the 
UK care industry’s large indirect effect is within the care sector itself, which means its 
indirect employment effect on other industries, at 0.2% points, is similar to that of other 
countries. This is consistent with the care sector in the UK outsourcing a particularly large 
proportion of its inputs within itself due to the intense local commissioning of private long-
term care by public authorities. This also explains why the UK’s direct employment effect in 
care relatively low. The total within-industry effects (both direct and indirect) for the UK at 
1.4% points is in the middle of its range over the countries studied. The other outlier is 
Australia, whose construction sector generates particularly large indirect employment effects 
(and the lowest direct employment effect), reflecting both outsourcing to specialised trades in 
other industries and sub-contracting between firms within the construction sector (Toner, 
2006). 
 
The indirect employment generated by investment in construction, like the direct 
employment, is also male-dominated (Table 4). However, the indirect employment generated 
by investment in care is not in general female-dominated. The argument that investing in 
construction infrastructure provides jobs for all – through indirectly generating jobs going to 
women as much as to men – is not supported by our results. But the (reverse) argument holds 
up better for care; although the direct jobs generated by investment in care are female 
dominated, the indirectly generated jobs in general favour men.  
 
Induced effects 
 
The induced effects of investment in the care sector are larger than those for the construction 
sector. This reflects higher additional earnings due to a larger Type II employment effect 
failing to outweigh generally lower wages in direct employment in care. That the gender 
breakdown of the induced employment effects is estimated to be the same for both industries 
is a consequence of our method of treating the household sector like an industry, which 
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entails the assumption that the proportions in which households spend their income do not 
vary.  
 
Total effects 
 
Summing the direct, indirect and induced employment effects, Table 3 and Figure 1 show 
that a much greater number of jobs are created overall (at least 50% more - except in Japan) 
by investment in care.  
 
Figure 1 Contributions of men and women to total employment rate increase  
 
Source: authors’ calculations (countries ranked by total employment generated by investment in care) 
 
Further, investment in care creates more jobs for women. However, because it creates so 
many more jobs overall, in most countries it is only slightly less effective than investment in 
construction in creating jobs for men (in the US, UK, Germany and Australia less than 20% 
fewer jobs). Therefore, investment in construction, one of the sectors likely to be thought 
about for an employment stimulus, is not the most effective way to boost overall 
employment, is far less effective for women’s employment and only somewhat more so for 
men’s. Indeed, investment in construction increases the gender employment gap, while 
investment in care decreases it.  
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Additional simulations  
 
Working hours  
 
To assess the extent to which different working hours in the care and construction industries 
contribute to our results, we repeated our simulations in terms of full-time equivalent (FTE) 
employment. Table 5 gives the ratio of employment effects both in FTEs and in headcount 
numbers (from Table 3), for every country except the USA, for which data on FTEs is not 
available. 
 
Since the method of analysis necessarily makes the two industries’ induced effects of 
identical composition their ratio is unchanged by switching to FTEs, but for direct and 
indirect effects the ratio is reduced, reflecting lower average hours worked in care than 
construction (Table 2), and to some extent in their supplying industries too. However, even in 
FTE terms investment in care generates far more employment than investment in 
construction. So, the differential effect, although reduced, cannot be attributed to differences 
in working hours alone. 
 
The last panel of Table 5 shows the effect of considering employees only (a necessary 
benchmark for the wage adjustment simulations carried out in the next section). Reflecting 
the larger proportion of employees in care than in construction (Table 2), the ratios of direct 
employment effects of investment in care relative to construction increase sharply, but less so 
for total effects (there is little change in indirect effects, and none in induced effects because 
in both estimations of the latter we have data on the additional income of only employees). 
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Table 5 Ratio of employment effects (care/construction) in headcount and FTE 
employment and employees 
 
   Ratio of headcount 
employment effects 
(care/construction) 
  Ratio of FTE employment 
effects (care/construction) 
Ratio of FTE employee effects* 
(care/construction) 
 
Direct  Indirect  Induced  Total    Direct Indirect Induced Total Direct  Indirect  Induced Total
Australia  4.7  0.3  1.9  2.0    3.8 0.3 1.9 1.7 4.8  0.3  1.9 1.9
Denmark  3.1  0.5  1.7  2.0    2.4 0.4 1.7 1.7 2.9  0.4  1.7 1.8
Germany  2.8  0.7  1.6  2.0    2.4 0.7 1.6 1.8 2.6  0.7  1.6 1.9
Italy  2.4  0.7  1.6  1.5    2.3 0.7 1.6 1.5 3.1  0.7  1.6 1.8
Japan  1.4  0.6  1.2  1.2    1.3 0.6 1.2 1.1 1.5  0.5  1.2 1.2
UK  2.5  2.2  1.4  2.2    2.1 2.0 1.4 1.9 3.2  2.3  1.4 2.5
USA  2.7  0.9  1.3  1.8    ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 3.5  0.8  1.3 2.0
Source: authors’ calculations. (*Headcount employees for USA) 
 
 
Wages 
 
To assess the extent to which different wages paid in the two industries contribute to our 
results, we have repeated our analyses assuming that wages in the two industries are the 
same, specifically that workers in care are paid the same as those in construction. In this 
section we estimate the result for full-time equivalent employees only, since deriving self-
employment income was not possible from the input-output information available. 
 
As Table 2 shows, except in Australia and the USA, neither industry pays above the average 
wage, but in all countries except Japan, construction workers are paid more than care 
workers, and in all except Australia, care workers are paid less than the average wage.  
 
Working out the effect of matching wages in care to those in construction on employment 
generation requires calculating anew: 
 
(i) direct employment effects, because higher wages will affect the price of care and 
hence how much can be purchased by a given sum of money; direct employment will 
be reduced by a factor that is less than proportional to the rise in wages.  
 
18 
 
(ii) employment multipliers; the same inputs will be needed per worker in care, so the 
Type I multiplier will not change, but the rise in earnings of care workers will change 
the Type II multiplier. 
 
The detail of the calculations and implicit assumptions made are provided in the Appendix. 
 
The last panel of Table 6 shows that in most countries, matching wages in care to those of 
construction reduces the total employment generated by investing in care by 7% or less. 
Indeed, it increases employment slightly in Japan, where wages in construction are lower 
than those in care, as would be expected. The two exceptions with a larger impact on 
employment creation are the UK and the USA, the countries in which care workers are 
exceptionally badly paid. Even in those countries, the more than doubling of wages in care 
needed to match those in construction reduces total employment creation by less than a third. 
In all countries, except Japan there is a loss in the direct and indirect jobs created (and 
therefore in the quantity of care provided), but this is partly compensated by additional 
induced employment due to the higher wages, so that care continues to outperform 
construction in total employment creation by at least a quarter in all countries and by at least 
two thirds in most.  
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Table 6 Ratio of increase in FTE employees (care/construction), before and after 
matching wages in care to those of construction 
 
 
Ratio of increase in FTE 
employees†, before wage match 
(Care/ Construction) 
 
Ratio of increase in FTE 
employees†, a er wage match 
(Care/ Construction) 
% change in employment effects 
from wage match 
  Direct  Indirect  Induced  Total    Direct  Indirect Induced Total  Direct  Indirect  Induced Total
Australia  4.8  0.3  1.9  1.9    4.7  0.3  1.9  1.9  ‐2%  ‐2%  0%  ‐2% 
Denmark  2.9  0.4  1.7  1.8    2.7  0.4  1.7  1.8  ‐5%  ‐5%  1%  ‐4% 
Germany  2.6  0.7  1.6  1.9    2.4  0.6  1.6  1.8  ‐8%  ‐8%  2%  ‐7% 
Italy  3.1  0.7  1.6  1.8    3.0  0.7  1.6  1.7  ‐5%  ‐5%  3%  ‐4% 
Japan  1.5  0.5  1.2  1.2    1.6  0.6  1.2  1.3  9%  9%  ‐2%  6% 
UK  3.2  2.3  1.4  2.5    1.9  1.4  1.6  1.7  ‐40%  ‐40%  15%  ‐33%
USA  3.5  0.8  1.3  2.0    2.0  0.5  1.4  1.4  ‐43%  ‐43%  11%  ‐29%
† For USA, headcount employees. Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Removing those other influences suggests that the additional employment effects of investing 
in care over those of construction must be structural, a result of differences in the labour and 
import intensity of the two industries. Even when wages are equalised and FTEs counted, 
care outperforms construction in job creation. It is therefore a better candidate for 
employment stimulus in times of less than full employment.  
 
Effects on fiscal revenue 
 
Even when employment levels are high, investing in care can expand the economy because, 
as well as increasing the demand for labour, investing in care increases its supply by freeing 
up those previously engaged in unpaid care to take employment or increase their working 
hours. This is not the case for construction jobs.4 Estimating the size of such an increase in 
labour supply has to be country-specific since it will depend on specific national care 
systems, the size and quality of the care investment relative to unmet need, who is currently 
performing unpaid care and on how likely they are to take employment if other forms of care 
are available.  
 
4 While new physical infrastructure such as a bridge may also subsequently enable some people to take jobs 
that they could not previously, the labour supply is not expanded during its construction. 
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Any jobs that are filled by people previously not in employment, whether through 
unemployment or care responsibilities, will reduce the net cost of the investment in care 
through generating tax revenues and reducing claims for social security benefit. Tax and 
benefit systems are highly country-specific, so net revenue effects are hard to estimate cross-
nationally, but a rough estimate of average wages and thus average tax due for each country 
can be calculated. For each country, Table 7 shows the tax wedge, the total income tax and 
social security contributions paid by an employee and their employer, divided by the total 
wage cost (gross earnings + employer’s social security contributions) at average wages. This 
can be used roughly to estimate total income tax and social security contributions from the 
new jobs created. 
 
Table 7 Short-term fiscal effects of investing in care and construction (FTE employees 
at matched wages) 
 
  
Tax wedge 
at average 
wages 
Net cost as 
percentage of gross 
cost 
Ratio (Care/ Construction) of 
increase in FTE employees†, 
matching 
      constr.  care  gross spending   net spending 
Australia  27%  85%  70%  1.9  2.3 
Denmark  37%  79%  65%  1.8  2.2 
Germany  49%  72%  54%  1.8  2.3 
Italy  47%  79%  67%  1.7  2.0 
Japan  31%  76%  71%  1.3  1.4 
UK  33%  82%  70%  1.7  1.9 
USA  31%  71%  58%  1.4  1.7 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
The tax wedge reduces the net cost of any investment in an industry. Table 7 shows that the 
net cost of an investment in construction ranges from 71% of its gross cost in the USA to 
85% in Australia, and for care, in the case where wages are equal to those in construction, 
from 54% in Germany to 71% in Japan. These relatively lower net costs mean that between 
29% and 46% of the gross spending in care is recouped in revenue from income tax and 
social security contributions.  
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This comparative ‘fiscal advantage’ of care over construction means equalising net spending 
gives investing in care a further advantage in employment creation over investing in 
construction. As Table 7 shows, equalising net spending in this way raises substantially the 
ratio of total FTE jobs created. In all countries, except Japan and the US, spending the same 
net amount on care as on construction would yield close to twice as many jobs in total.  
 
However, if the economy is at full capacity, many jobs created in construction will be filled 
by existing workers, reducing the revenue gain, so gross and net spending will not differ 
much. By contrast, because investment in care frees up unpaid carers to take at least some of 
the new jobs created, then more of the full revenue gain can be expected to be realised.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Conventionally, governments wishing to boost the economy tend to invest in physical 
infrastructure, seeing such investment as a means of raising employment in the short-term 
that also generates longer-term economic prosperity. Such thinking tends to see spending on 
care and other forms of social infrastructure as an unproductive cost, rather than as making an 
investment in the economy and its long-term future. In many countries, this sector is targeted 
for cuts in times of fiscal consolidation.  
 
This paper has shown that greater employment gains can be made by investing in social 
infrastructure, and specifically in the care industry. Further, the employment gains of 
investing in care are not reliant on unemployment, because care services enable unpaid carers 
to take employment and thus expand the labour supply. This is not a feature of most physical 
infrastructure investment. 
 
Even accounting for the shorter hours and lower wages paid in the care industry, investment 
in it still produces more jobs overall than investment in construction, owing to structural 
differences between the two sectors: care is a more labour-intensive and less import-intensive 
industry than construction. Investment in care also yields far more employment for women 
and not substantially less for men, reducing the gender employment gap, whereas investment 
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in construction increases it. Further, the fiscal returns from investing in care are higher, 
allowing greater investment for the same net cost. 
 
Now that, after years of austerity, expansionary public investment-led fiscal policies are 
being considered, such results need to become more widely known. At the very least our 
results show that governments and international institutions, such as the IMF, the OECD and 
the World Bank, would benefit from conducting gendered employment analyses of such 
policies. Social infrastructure investment policies should be considered on an equal basis with 
physical infrastructure programmes, and where the latter are still implemented, they should 
be complemented by policies to mitigate their adverse effects on gender employment gaps. 
 
Further research at the country level could establish more refined employment characteristics 
of the jobs created, such as their wage distribution, include consideration of the earnings of 
the self-employed and more detailed analysis of the fiscal impact of any such investment. De 
Henau (2019), for example, calculated that for the UK investing in high quality free universal 
childcare, while costing 3.1% of GDP annually, would recoup that total cost in fewer than ten 
years from the increased maternal employment it would enable. 
 
Of course, the case for investing public funds in high quality care services does not rely 
solely on the employment it creates, or even its beneficial effects on gender employment 
gaps. Public investment in care is required to support those in need of it, children and frail 
elderly alike, and to alleviate and support the unpaid work of their parents and carers. While 
children come in both sexes, the majority of those in need of long-term care are women, as 
are most of those providing unpaid care, making this a gender equality issue too (OECD, 
2011).   
 
Longitudinal estimations of the economic and social benefits of such policies would 
strengthen the case. But these will also require different measures that better capture the 
benefits of a more equal society and improved well-being. Only then will we be able to show 
how much spending on care is really an investment, adding to well-being while preventing 
the need for less effective and often more expensive interventions later on.  
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Appendix 
Calculations of the employment effect of wage adjustments 
 
To work the effect of changing wages in care on employment generation requires calculating 
changed: 
 
(i) direct employment effects 
(ii) employment multipliers 
 
Direct employment effects 
To calculate these we have to assume that care is not a significant input into any other 
industry’s production. This assumption is justified by observing that, the maximum 
proportion of its total input cost spent on care by any other industry is 2.8% in Italy for the 
healthcare industry, while for most industries it is virtually zero.  
 
Despite the wage change, from  to , the same amount is invested in care, so the 
additional output of care  is unchanged in price terms. So (using ′ to indicate variables 
whose values may have changed) 
	 	 	 	  	 	 	                                                 (1) 
 
where  is the direct employment generated by the investment in care,  the average wage 
level in care per FTE, so that  is the wage component and  the non-wage component of 
that investment. 
 
Then (using lower case letters for ratios assumed not to change) 
 
	 	 	 	 	where, 
 
	 	taxes on products and other non-wage components (profits) of value-added in the 
care industry (assumed a fixed proportion  of the value of output, ) and  
 
	 	 	 	  cost of intermediate goods used by the care industry, where: 
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 cost of care as an intermediate good used in the production of , assumed a fixed 
proportion 	of , since any change in the price of care will affect care as an output and as an 
input in the same way  
 
	 	  cost of non-care intermediate goods used in the production of , assumed a 
fixed proportion  of ,	the newly generated direct employment in care, since the cost of non-
care intermediate goods per worker in care should be unchanged because the price of those 
goods has not changed  
 
So that 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	                                                                                   
(2) 
 
Substituting for 		and 	in equation (1): 
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	                                                        
(3) 
 
but  , so that 
/       
 
Thus, if wages change from 	to , direct employment generated is changed by a factor of  
 
 
Indirect and induced effects 
 
As explained in the paper, the Type I multiplier, 1 ,	stays the same, so that 
 
	                                                                                                                                               
(4)  
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To calculate the Type II multiplier, 1 M1 , we have to make an additional assumption, 
that care is not a significant consumer good, so that any change in the price of care does not 
significantly affect how household income is spent. This assumption is justified by observing 
that the proportion spent on care by households is greatest at 3.3% in the US, less than 2% in 
Japan, Australia and Denmark and less than 1% in Italy, Germany and the UK. 
 
Any change in the size of 	depends, for each directly employed worker in care, purely on 
how many directly and indirectly employed workers’ pay has changed, and how large that 
change is. The Type 1 within-care employment multiplier,	 , gives the number of workers 
directly and indirectly employed in care per directly employed worker in care. These are the 
only workers who receive pay changes. 
 
Then if wages in care change from  to  (in national currency units) 
 
	                                                                                                                  
(5) 
 
where  is the employment directly generated by households spending an additional unit of 
national currency (a constant, since the composition of household spending is assumed fixed).  
 
 
 
